89-1097

No.

Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
JAN 10 1990
JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR.
CLERK

In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1989

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CROSS-PETITIONER

v.

FOLDING CARTON RESERVE FUND, ET AL.

CROSS-PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

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QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the United States may be estopped from enforcing the final mandate of a court of appeals which provides, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. 2042, that certain unclaimed settlement funds are to be deposited in the federal Treasury "in the name and to the credit of" the United States.

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

Petitioner, which filed a motion to intervene in the district court and was appellant in the court of appeals, is the United States. Respondents are the Folding Carton Reserve Fund and the parties in the court of appeals. Those parties are the Certified Plaintiff Class in MDL-250,* represented by class representatives Beatrice Companies, G. Heileman Brewing Co., Grist Mill Co., Land O'Lakes, Inc., Cumberland Farm Dairies, Inc., and Pantry Pride Enterprises, Inc. (which were the plaintiffs in the district court and appellees in the court of appeals); the Anheuser Busch Companies, Inc. (which was a party in the court of appeals); and the Folding Carton Administration Committee (which was created by the district court to act on its behalf in settlement distributions and in the court of appeals and filed a brief on behalf of the district court in the court of appeals).

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* The plaintiff class consists of the following:

All persons in the United States (excluding defendants, their subsidiaries, affiliates, or agents), who purchased folding cartons from any of the defendants in these actions during the period from January 1, 1960 to December 31, 1974.

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The Solicitor General, on behalf of the United States, respectfully cross-petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in this case.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals, 89-927 Pet. App. 1b-22b, is reported at 881 F.2d 494. The opinion of the district court, 89-927 Pet. App. 1j-30j, is reported at 687 F. Supp. 1223.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals, 89-927 Pet. App. 1a-3a, was entered on September 11, 1989. A petition for rehearing was denied on September 15, 1989. 89-927 Pet. App. 1e-2e. A petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition or, in the alternative, for a writ of certiorari was filed

in No. 89-927 on December 11, 1989, and was received by the United States on that date. Petitions for a writ of certiorari were filed in No. 89-992 and No. 89-1081 on December 11, 1989, and were received by the United States on January 3, 1990, and January 2, 1990, respectively. This cross-petition for a writ of certiorari is being filed pursuant to Rule 12.3 of the Rules of this Court. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

1. 28 U.S.C. 2041 provides:

> All moneys paid into any court of the United States, or received by the officers thereof, in any case pending or adjudicated in such court, shall be forthwith deposited with the Treasurer of the United States or a designated depositary, in the name and to the credit of such court.
>
> This section shall not prevent the delivery of any such money to the rightful owners upon security, according to agreement of parties, under the direction of the court.

2. 28 U.S.C. 2042 provides:

> No money deposited under section 2041 of this title shall be withdrawn except by order of court.
>
> In every case in which the right to withdraw money deposited in court under section 2041 has been adjudicated or is not in dispute and such money has remained so deposited for at least five years unclaimed by the person entitled thereto, such court shall cause such money to be deposited in the Treasury in the name and to the credit of the United States. Any claimant entitled to any such money may, on petition to the court and upon notice to the United States attorney and full proof of the right thereto, obtain an order directing payment to him.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The facts of this case are set forth in detail in the United States' brief in opposition in No. 89-927, No. 89-992 and No. 89-1081. The jurisdiction of the district court was based on 28 U.S.C. 1331 and 28 U.S.C. 1337.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE CROSS-PETITION

As explained in the United States' brief in opposition in No. 89-927, No. 89-992 and No. 89-1081, this is a novel case whose result depends heavily on the peculiar procedural history of this litigation. For that reason, among others, the United States believes that the most prudent course for this Court is to decline review of the court of appeals' decision altogether.

If this Court is inclined to review the court of appeals' decision, however, that review should encompass the court of appeals' ruling that the United States is estopped from enforcing the court of appeals' own prior mandate regarding the disposition of the reserve fund, a mandate that rests directly on 28 U.S.C. 2042. The court of appeals' estoppel ruling is fundamentally flawed, and because that ruling underlies the court of appeals' disposition of this case, meaningful review of the decision below necessitates inclusion of the estoppel ruling.

1. For reasons set forth in detail in the government's submissions to this Court in *Office of Personnel Management* v. *Richmond*, cert. granted, No. 88-1943 (Oct. 2, 1989), the doctrine of equitable estoppel should not be applied against the United States. First, the federal government may not be estopped from enforcing the public laws because Congress has not waived the sovereign immunity of the United States to the assertion of estoppel claims. Second, to give the force of law to misstatements by Executive Branch officials, in contravention of statutory provisions enacted by Congress and signed into law by the President,

would violate basic principles of separation of powers. Third, estopping the government from enforcing the laws disserves the public interest by creating uncontrolled and potentially enormous claims on the public fisc, by fueling litigation characterized by problems of proof, and by inviting fraud or collusion by public officials. For these reasons, challenges to government actions founded upon estoppel should not be entertained absent express authorization by Congress.[1] Although this case concerns the United States' attempt to enforce a court of appeals' mandate, rather than a public law, the mandate itself simply gives effect to an explicit statutory provision. The fact that the statutory obligation does not stand alone, but has instead been incorporated into a lawful judicial order, simply reinforces the case against estopping the United States.

2. Even if this Court's decision in *Richmond* were to leave open the possibility of estoppel against the United States in some cases, estoppel would not be appropriate here.

a. To establish equitable estoppel against a private party, a litigant must show that it reasonably relied on the conduct of that party and that it "did not know nor should it have known" the true facts. *Wisconsin Winnebago Business Committee* v. *Koberstein*, 762 F.2d 613, 620 (7th Cir. 1985). Here, no party can satisfy this test, because the lack of settlement authority on the part of the U.S. Attorney's Office is clearly set out in the Code of Federal Regulations. See 28 C.F.R. 0.160(a)(2), 0.161, 0.168(a), and Appendix to Subpt Y, § 1(c)(2).[2] The parties who wish to settle this

[1] Copies of our briefs in *Richmond* have been provided to the other parties in this case.

[2] Although the court of appeals did not resolve the applicability of these regulations, the court suggested that they might not apply because "the government had no unconditional right of ownership" to the surplus funds under Section 2042. 89-927 Pet. App. 12b. The

multi-million dollar matter, represented by sophisticated legal counsel, can hardly claim that they should not reasonably have known about these regulations or been charged with the duty to look them up.

Similarly, the settling parties cannot claim that they reasonably relied on *oral* statements from officials in the U.S. Attorney's Office to settle a multi-million dollar legal dispute when the settlement they proposed plainly violated the court of appeals' direction that the funds be deposited in the U.S. Treasury.[3] Indeed, the parties' failure to obtain *any* written approval of the settlement from *any* representative of the United States under these circumstances totally defeats an assertion of reasonable reliance. See *Heckler* v. *Community Health Services, Inc.*, 467 U.S. 51, 65 (1984) ("The appropriateness of respondent's reliance is further undermined because the advice it received * * * was oral."); *Schweiker* v. *Hansen*, 450 U.S. 785, 788-789 n.4 (1981); see also *Tennessee* v. *Dole*, 749 F.2d 331, 337-338 (6th Cir. 1984) (no estoppel based on conversation with an Assistant Attorney General), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1018 (1985).

Nor can the claimants who received windfall payments under the settlement assert an estoppel. Both the district

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observation that Section 2042 does not vest the United States with an "unconditional" right of ownership is correct but irrelevant. The departmental regulations in question apply to all "money claims against the United States," 28 C.F.R. 0.160(a)(2); whether the government's interest in the property is conditional or unconditional is of no consequence under the terms of the regulations. It is undisputed that the court of appeals' original mandate vested the United States with *some* interest in the funds; thus, any settlement that purports to dispose of that interest is governed by the regulations.

[3] The district court itself noted the possible problem at a March 27, 1985, hearing, explaining that one of the participants asked whether the district court had jurisdiction to approve the settlement, given the court of appeals' prior ruling, and the district court stated that "that has been a matter of concern." Gov't C.A. App. 26.

court and the court of appeals had held that previously-paid claimants, because they had already been compensated for their antitrust injuries, had no legal or equitable rights to any portion of the reserve fund. Therefore, those claimants would be trying to use estoppel to retain possession of funds which they had no right to receive but for the government's error. This Court has barred estoppel in that very circumstance. See *Community Health Services*, 467 U.S. at 62-63.[4]

b. Even if the elements of estoppel applicable to private parties were satisfied in this case, the fact that no government official engaged in affirmative misconduct precludes application of an estoppel against the United States. This Court has made clear that prejudice is not synonymous with affirmative misconduct and that a finding of prejudice without more does not justify estopping the government. See, *e.g.*, *Montana* v. *Kennedy*, 366 U.S. 308 (1961) (plaintiff deprived of opportunity to become a citizen and deported as an alien); *Federal Crop Insurance Co.* v. *Merrill*, 332 U.S. 380 (1947) (entire season's crop lost with no insurance). As the Court held in *Hansen*, 450 U.S. at 790, erroneous advice from a governmental official falls "far short of conduct which would raise a serious question whether petitioner is estopped from insisting upon compliance with the valid regulation." Thus, the incorrect oral statements made by officials of the U.S. Attorney's Office do not constitute affirmative misconduct. For that reason alone, equitable estoppel is inappropriate here.

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[4] It would also be difficult for the litigants to establish any cognizable injury from their reliance on the U.S. Attorney's Office's oral statements. Even if that reliance caused the district court and litigants to withdraw their requests for this Court's review of the court of appeals' ruling, there was a very slim chance of such review being granted, and an even lower likelihood that the challenged judgment would have been reversed, as indicated by the court of appeals when it denied a motion to stay its original mandate. See Gov't C.A. App. 16-17.

Far from responding to these points, the court of appeals' opinion fails altogether to address them. At no point did the court explain why the traditional requirements of estoppel were satisfied or what acts of the U.S. Attorney's Office constituted affirmative misconduct. 89-927 Pet. App. 13b-14b. In the end, the court's estoppel ruling is little more than an *ipse dixit*. For the reasons given above, that ruling is not simply unsupported but incorrect as well.

3. If the Court agrees that the United States may not be estopped from enforcing 28 U.S.C. 2042 and the court of appeals' mandate, then the judgment below should be reversed and the reserve fund should be deposited in the U.S. Treasury "in the name and to the credit of the United States." In its original decision, the court of appeals explained that "Section 2042 applies directly to the case before us" and that the order directing the surplus funds to "escheat" to the United States "merely implements a direct Congressional mandate for the disposition of residual funds deposited with a district court." *In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation*, 744 F.2d 1252, 1259 (7th Cir. 1984). Accordingly, the settlement agreements in this case violated not only the court's original mandate, but also 28 U.S.C. 2042. The court of appeals itself recognized that the agreements are "not in keeping with the mandate of this court." 89-927 Pet. App. 6b. Because the court's mandate is designed to implement 28 U.S.C. 2042, and because the settlement agreements are at odds with the mandate, reversal of the court of appeals' estoppel ruling requires that the reserve fund be returned to the federal Treasury.

This result applies not just to the half of the reserve fund granted to law schools for research (which the court of appeals overturned), but also to the half of the reserve fund paid to those members of the plaintiff class who already had received compensation under prior distributions (which the court of appeals let stand). 89-927 Pet. App. 14b. With

respect to the latter half of the fund, the court of appeals reasoned that the "additional distribution to class claimants * * * is no longer a concern to this court in view of our holding that the United States has no remaining interest in the Reserve Fund, but it would be quite to the contrary if the interest given the government remained." 89-927 Pet. App. 14b. Because the distribution to class claimants was permissible only because the United States' interest in the funds had been forfeited by estoppel, reversal of the estoppel ruling requires recovery of that distribution.[5]

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[5] The Court can grant this cross-petition and review the court of appeals' estoppel ruling without having to address whether the United States was entitled to intervene in the district court as a party under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a). Although we believe that the district court and the court of appeals erred in disallowing intervention, the government's party status or lack thereof is rendered academic by Fed. R. Civ. P. 71. Rule 71 provides that "[w]hen an order is made in favor of a person who is not a party to the action," the person "may enforce obedience to the order by the same process as if a party * * *." Because the court of appeals' original mandate, which directed the surplus funds to be deposited in the Treasury "in the name and to the credit of the United States," 28 U.S.C. 2042, was plainly "made in favor of" the United States, Rule 71 authorizes the United States to seek enforcement of the mandate as if it were a party. Accordingly, this cross-petition may be granted without addressing the issue of intervention.

Of course, the presence of the United States as a party makes it unnecessary for this Court to reach the issues raised in No. 89-927, No. 89-992 and No. 89-1081. The government's objection to the settlement reached by the parties presents a clear case or controversy under Article III.

CONCLUSION

If the Court is inclined to review the judgement of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit below, then this cross-petition, the petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition or, in the alternative, for a writ of certiorari in No. 89-927, and the petitions for a writ of certiorari No. 89-992 and No. 89-1081, should be held pending the Court's decision in *Office of Personnel Management* v. *Richmond*, cert. granted, No. 88-1943. This case should then be disposed of in a manner consistent with the Court's decision in *Richmond*.

Respectfully submitted.

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JANUARY 1990

:: U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1989—262 203/00707

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JOINT BRIEF OF PETITIONERS-CROSS-RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION TO GOVERNMENT'S CROSS-PETITION FOR CERTIORARI

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REASONS FOR DENYING THE CROSS-PETITION

1. The Cross-Petition candidly admits that the Government does not view the issues in this case as deserving of review. The Government filed no petition for certiorari of its own within the time provided by the rules. It urges denial of the principal Petitions, recognizing that such action would require denial of its Cross-Petition. Its Cross-Petition appears to be merely a tactical device to permit it to file an opposition to our Petitions, something which it is otherwise in no position to do.

Pointedly, the Government's Cross-Petition does not seek to obtain any funds for itself. The Government has no standing, and it cannot manufacture standing

by filing a Cross-Petition which it urges the Court to deny. The Cross-Petition is not a genuine request for review and should be denied.

2. The Government argues that this case involves an estoppel issue of consequence. But estoppel is not at issue here. The district court determined that the Government's petition for leave to intervene under rule 24(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to enforce the claimed "escheat" was not "timely" within the meaning of rule 24, in light of the criteria established in *United States* v. *Kemper Money Market Fund, Inc.*, 704 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1983).[1]

In so holding, the district court found that the Government had been notified of its possible interest by December 1984. On six other occasions before April 1, 1985, the Government had received further notice of the proposed settlement by letter, telephone, official notice and face-to-face conversations. The Government also received notice of the March 27, 1985 hearing at which any objections to the settlement agreement were to be heard. The Government de-

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[1] In that case, the Seventh Circuit said that a court should consider several factors in deciding whether an intervention motion is timely, including:

> the length of time the intervenor knew or should have known of her or his interest in the case; the extent of prejudice to the original litigating parties from the intervenor's delay; the extent of prejudice to the would-be intervenor if her or his motion is denied; and any unusual circumstances.

704 F.2d at 391. *See also NAACP* v. *New York*, 413 U.S. 345 (1973); *City of Bloomington, Indiana* v. *Westinghouse Electric Corp.*, 824 F.2d 531 (7th Cir. 1987).

clined to appear and advised the court that it had no objection to the settlement.[2]

In considering the timeliness of the Government's application, the district court also determined that the Government's intervention at that late date would have caused substantial prejudice to the parties. By the time the Government sought to overturn the settlement, the petitions in this Court had been withdrawn in reliance upon the settlement,[3] over $2,000,000 had been distributed to some 2,700 individual members of the plaintiff class, and hundreds

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[2] The Cross-Petition suggests, but does not state, that the U.S. Attorney's Office in Chicago did not consult the Department of Justice in Washington. (Cross-Petition at 4-5.) However, as both lower court opinions pointed out, the internal Justice Department regulation regarding consultation is not on its face applicable to this situation which involves no claim by or against the Government. Moreover, this Court must proceed on the presumption of regularity—that any necessary intragovernmental communication took place. This inference is further warranted by the fact that the Government, although invited by the district court to do so, declined to present any evidence on this point.

[3] Judges Robson and Will and the other petitioners would have been prejudiced by the Government's tardy intervention to reopen the settlement because they had withdrawn their petitions for review in this Court, in reliance upon the settlement and the U.S. Attorney's representations that the Government had no interest in challenging it. The Government asserts in its Cross-Petition that even if such reliance caused the withdrawal of the petitions, "there was a very slim chance of such review being granted, and an even lower likelihood that the challenged judgment would have been reversed." (Cross-Petition at 6, n.4.) To our knowledge, this is the first time that the Solicitor General has shared with this Court his prognostications concerning the manner in which the Court would have exercised its certiorari jurisdiction.

of hours had been expended by attorneys, employees and accountants for the claimants, the Administration Committee, and the court, as well as the representatives of the six law schools that applied for grants.

The district court also found that there were no unusual circumstances justifying the Government's long delay. Accordingly, it determined that the attempt to intervene was untimely, simply too late. (Appendix J to Petition of Petitioner Hubert L. Will, at 21j-22j.) The word "estoppel" does not appear in the district court's opinion.

Surely the Government does not and cannot contend that it is immune from the temporal requirements of the Federal Rules. Some rules do provide the Government with additional time to perform certain acts, but rule 24 is not one of them. An application to intervene—by anyone—must be timely, and the Government's application certainly was not.

The court of appeals affirmed the district court's ruling, finding that the Government's application was not timely. (App. B, at 13b.) In its analysis, it also referred to the doctrine of estoppel, but its affirmance of the district court's denial of the intervention motion is amply supported by the Government's lack of timeliness. *Office of Personnel Management* v. *Richmond*, *cert. granted*, No. 88-1943, which is solely an estoppel case with no issue of timeliness under rule 24, thus has no bearing here, and the Court need not await the outcome of that case to dispose of the Government's Cross-Petition.[4]

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[4] The Government contends, somewhat curiously, that its own estoppel issue is moot because of the operation of rule 71 of

3. The Cross-Petition also fails entirely to address the issue that was central to the Government's purported interest in this case: whether the *Folding Carton* residual settlement fund should escheat to the federal government pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2041-42.

For a variety of reasons, we suggest that, as both lower courts found, such an "escheat" theory is untenable: (1) Section 2042 provides not for an escheat—a reversion of the funds to the federal treasury—but only for a deposit with a stakeholder pending later disbursements on court order. (2) The $200,000,000 *Folding Carton* settlement fund was never paid into any court, but was maintained in an escrow account and invested with court approval, earning over $30,000,000. (3) There were no unclaimed funds, but rather funds claimed by both plaintiffs and defendants in the class action and awaiting judicial disposition.

The "escheat" theory was abandoned by the court of appeals in the decision below, and was not raised by the Government in an original petition for certiorari. It is not deserving of this Court's further attention.

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the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but does not seek certiorari in connection with the latter, perhaps in part because it failed to make the argument below. Accordingly, there appears to be no reason for this Court to concern itself with rule 71. In any event, we note that the Government sought leave in 1987 to intervene in the district court because that was the only way it could participate in the case and assert its purported interest. The Government was not a party, and instead of asserting any rights it might arguably have possessed under rule 71, it waived them by announcing in 1985 that it had no objection to the settlement.

CONCLUSION

The Court should deny the Government's Cross-Petition and grant Petitioners' Petitions.

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DISTRIBUTED
MAR 2 1990

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REPLY BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES

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REPLY BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES

1. Cross-respondents answer the government's cross-petition by asserting that the court of appeals' judgment estopping the United States from enforcing its interest in the settlement fund surplus might be placed on an alternate basis of decision. The alternate ground to which cross-respondents refer is the alleged untimeliness of the government's motion to intervene in the district court under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a).

But as our cross-petition points out, Cross-Pet. 8 n.5, this Court need not address the timeliness of the government's motion to intervene because, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 71, "[w]hen an order is made in favor of a person who is not a party to the action," that person "may enforce obedience to the order by the same process as if a party." Rule 71 applies here because the court of appeals'

original mandate directing that the surplus funds be deposited in the Treasury "in the name and to the credit of the United States," 28 U.S.C. 2042, was plainly made in favor of the United States.

Cross-respondents nonetheless maintain that the government was required to intervene in the district court; that the government failed to invoke Rule 71 in the court of appeals; and that Rule 71 moots the estoppel issue. Br. in Opp. 4-5 n.4. None of those contentions has merit.

First, the government was not required to intervene in the district court because it was entitled to petition for a writ of mandamus in the court of appeals. It is well settled that mandamus is the appropriate mechanism to enforce an appellate mandate. See *General Atomic Co.* v. *Felter*, 436 U.S. 493, 497 (1978); *Will* v. *United States*, 389 U.S. 90, 95-96 (1967). Moreover, because an appellate court has inherent, plenary power to consider on its own motion whether its mandate has been violated, *United States* v. *E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.*, 366 U.S. 316, 325 (1961); *Continental Insurance Co.* v. *United States*, 259 U.S. 156, 166 (1922), an appellate court can issue a writ of mandamus to enforce its mandate even "where there is no existing or future appellate jurisdiction to which it can relate," *United States* v. *United States District Court*, 334 U.S. 258, 263 (1948); accord, *Department of the Navy* v. *FLRA*, 835 F.2d 921, 923-924 (1st Cir. 1987). Contrary to cross-respondents' contention, therefore, intervention in the district court under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) was neither the exclusive nor a required means to seek enforcement of the Seventh Circuit mandate.*

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* Indeed, cross-respondents (at least in their capacity as petitioners) agree in their joint reply brief in No. 89-927, No. 89-992, and No. 89-1081 that the government was entitled to petition the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus. On page 9 of that document they

Second, notwithstanding cross-respondents' unsupported assertion to the contrary, the government pressed its right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 71 to enforce its interest in the surplus settlement funds. Indeed, it did so on three separate occasions in the court of appeals. At page 39 of the government's opening brief we quoted Rule 71 and explained that it authorized the government to seek direct enforcement of the court of appeals' earlier mandate. Again, at page 7 of the "Petition by the United States to Enforce this Court's Mandate and for a Writ of Mandamus," the government quoted Rule 71 and made the same point. And again, at page 2 of the "Response by the United States to Motion to Change Title and Designation of Case," we quoted Rule 71 a third time and pointed out that intervention by the government in the district court was not a prerequisite to enforcement of the government's interest in the settlement fund as recognized by the outstanding appellate mandate. Cross-respondents are clearly incorrect in asserting that the government failed to invoke Rule 71 in the court below.

Third, Rule 71 does not "moot" the court of appeals' erroneous application of equitable estoppel in this case. Br. in Opp. 4 n.4. If cross-respondents mean that Rule 71 bars the application of equitable estoppel against a party, we disagree. A rule respecting a party's status has no bearing on the rights such a party can claim. To be sure, the government contends that the timeliness of its attempt to intervene under *Rule 24(a)* need not be reached because Rule 71 entitles the government to seek enforcement of the appellate

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contend that the court of appeals erroneously "[c]onvert[ed] a mandamus action into an ordinary appeal, denying a motion to treat the action as a mandamus proceeding, and then deciding it by the standards governing ordinary appeals rather than the higher standards applicable to mandamus actions."

mandate "as if a party." But the government's status as a party to this case is quite different from the interest it can enforce once that party status is recognized.

Because Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 71 entitles the United States to participate in this case and to enforce its interest in the surplus funds, the asserted untimeliness of the government's motion to intervene in the district court is not an independent ground for the judgment in this case. The court of appeals' ruling that the United States was estopped from asserting its interest recognized in the earlier Seventh Circuit rulings is therefore squarely presented. See 89-927 Pet. App. 10b-14b (discussing application of equitable estoppel doctrine against the United States and "invok[ing] an estoppel against the United States" here).

2. Cross-respondents do not defend the court of appeals' application of estoppel against the United States. See Cross-Pet. 3-7 (explaining why the doctrine of equitable estoppel should not be applied against the United States for reasons including those set forth in the government's submissions in *Office of Personnel Management* v. *Richmond*, No. 88-1943 (argued Feb. 21, 1990)). Instead, cross-respondents contend that the court of appeals' *original* mandate was incorrect—*i.e.*, that 28 U.S.C. 2042 does not apply to the surplus settlement fund. Those contentions—which were all resolved adversely to cross-respondents by the court of appeals in its first judgment, 89-927 Pet. App. 4g-6g—are not at issue here. The petitions for review of the earlier judgment were voluntarily dismissed pursuant to then-applicable Supreme Court Rule 53 (1980). *In re Robson*, 471 U.S. 1120 (1985). And as we argue in our brief in opposition to the petitions in No. 89-927, No. 89-992, and No. 89-1081, cross-respondents' disagreement with that court of appeals' mandate did not justify their decision to "settle [the] case on terms inconsistent with a binding prior mandate of an appellate court." 89-927 Br. in Opp. 16.

3. Cross-respondents assert that the government's cross-petition is a "tactical device" to allow it to file a brief in opposition to the petitions in No. 89-927, No. 89-992, and No. 89-1081. Not true. The United States filed a brief in opposition and a cross-petition for the precise reasons stated in those documents: We do not believe that this matter, in light of its bizarre posture and history, warrants review by this Court; but if such review is granted, it should include review of the estoppel ruling by which the Seventh Circuit prevented the United States from asserting its interest in enforcement of the prior appellate mandate.

In advancing this position, the United States is unquestionably entitled to oppose the petitions in No. 89-927, No. 89-992, and No. 89-1081 under the Rules of this Court. See Sup. Ct. R. 12.4 (with respect to certiorari, "[a]ll parties to the proceeding in the court whose judgment is sought to be reviewed shall be deemed parties in this Court"); Sup. Ct. R. 20.3(b) (with respect to extraordinary writs, "every other party to the proceeding in respect of which relief is desired * * * may * * * file * * * a brief or briefs in opposition thereto"). See also Sup. Ct. R. 19.6 (1980) (certiorari); Sup. Ct. R. 27.2(b) (1980) (extraordinary writs). Tellingly, cross-respondents cite to no Rule holding to the contrary, nor do they question the fact that the United States was a party in the proceedings before the court of appeals.

For the foregoing reasons, and for those stated in our cross-petition, if the Court is inclined to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit below, then this cross-petition and the petitions for review in No. 89-927, No. 89-992, and No. 89-1081 should be held pending the Court's decision in *Office of Personnel Management* v. *Richmond*, No. 88-1943. This case should then be disposed of in light of *Richmond*.

Respectfully submitted.

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MARCH 1990

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1990—262 203/00784